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ARGUMENT 
 
1. THERE WAS A MATERIAL MODIFICATION  
a. Restatement of Suretyship & Guaranty § 41 
Plaintiff relies on the Court of Appeals ruling in DiMeo v. Nupetco 
Associates, 2013 UT App 188, 309 P.3d 251, and the  Restatement (Third) 
of Suretyship & Guaranty § 41 (Am. Law Inst. 1996) for the proposition that 
the Workout Agreement was only an extension of time and therefore not a 
material modification.1  Plaintiff’s Brief page 10.  However, the Plaintiff 
brief disregards the language and posture of the Workout Agreement and the 
Restatement.  The Workout Agreement was a substitute contract which 
increased the risk of greater liability on Defendant Cao.  
 The Court of Appeals and the Plaintiff rely heavily on the initial 
language in Restatement (Third) of Suretyship & Guaranty § 41 (Am. Law 
                                                          
1 The Plaintiff’s use of Creech is surprising considering this Court 
specifically declined to rule on the issue stating: “The younger Creeches also 
argue that the stipulation between their parents and the bank materially 
modified the terms of the commercial debts they had accepted as guarantors 
and that this modification constitutes a discharge of their obligations to 
perform. We decline to address this contention. Because the trial court ruled 
that the stipulation was unenforceable and none of the parties appealed that 
ruling, the younger Creeches may not raise the issue here.” First Sec. Bank 
v. Creech, 858 P.2d 958, 961, 967 (Utah 1993) (cite omitted).  The actual 
rulings in Creech have no bearing on the issues before the Court. 
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Inst. 1996) which allows for extensions of time.  The Restatement should be 
read in its entirety, not through snippets.  The Restatement states:  
If the principal obligor and the obligee agree to a modification, 
other than an extension of time or a complete or partial release, 
of the principal obligor's duties pursuant to the underlying 
obligation: 
(a) any duty of the principal obligor to the secondary obligor of 
performance or reimbursement is correspondingly modified; 
(b) the secondary obligor is discharged from any unperformed duties 
pursuant to the secondary obligation: 
(i) if the modification creates a substituted contract or imposes 
risks on the secondary obligor fundamentally different from 
those imposed pursuant to the transaction prior to modification; 
(ii) in other cases, to the extent that the modification would 
otherwise cause the secondary obligor a loss;  
(c) to the extent that the secondary obligor is not discharged by 
operation of paragraph (b) from its duties: 
(i) the secondary obligation is correspondingly modified; but 
(ii) if the modification of the underlying obligation changes the 
amount of money payable thereunder, or the timing of such 
payment, the secondary obligor may perform the secondary 
obligation as though there had been no modification; 
(d) the secondary obligor has a claim against the obligee to the extent 
provided in § 37(4). Restatement (Third) of Suretyship & Guaranty § 
41 (Am. Law Inst. 1996) 
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The facts in this case would warrant application subsections (b)(i) and (b)(ii) 
of Restatement §41.   
At the time the Workout Agreement was created, Defendant Cao was 
seeking to compel Defendant Lin’s eviction.  Defendant Cao had also filed a 
Motion for Summary Judgment which led to a favorable ruling from the 
Court.  Had Plaintiff and Defendant Lin not reached this agreement, 
Defendant Cao would have been released from her surety obligation under 
the Lease.  Because of the Workout Agreement, mooted the parties dispute, 
Defendant Cao was denied the favorable ruling that was pending in 2010.  
The Workout therefore cause Defendant Cao a loss as envisioned under 
subsection (b)(ii).      
The Lease Agreement required Defendant to make regular monthly 
payments.  The Workout Agreement substituted additional terms to the 
original Lease Agreement.  The Workout Agreement therefore created a 
substitute contract thereby relieving Defendant Cao of her obligations under 
subsection (b)(ii).   
The Workout Agreement had the following terms: 
1. Defendant Lin was to make 4 monthly payments of $4,000.00 and 
1 payment of $1,500.00. 
4 
 
2. The payments under the agreement were in addition to Defendant 
Lin’s regularly monthly rent payments. 
3. Plaintiff agreed write off $6,451.28 of the late charges if, and only 
if, the monthly back balance payments are received on or before 
each payment due date.   
4. If any payments are late, Defendant Lin was to pay the previous 
late charges amount of $6,451.28 as well as any additional interest, 
collection/legal fees, or late charges that accrued.   
By June 2010, Defendant Lin was incurring $1,069.18 a month in late 
charges due to past due amounts, including past due late charges.  The 
Workout Agreement agreed to waive 7/8th of the late charges, if Defendant 
Lin paid timely.  But if Defendant Lin failed to make the payments timely, 
then the prior late charges would have been reinstated and additional late 
charges would have been added to the balance.  Under the Workout 
Agreement, had Defendant Lin timely paid the $4,000.00 per month and had 
he timely paid his rent, but had he been late on the last $1,500.00, he still 
would have incurred the full charge of the past due late charges and because 
those charges would have been reinstated, he would have incurred late 
charges for the four months that he made timely payments because of the 
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outstanding late charges.  This would have caused the late charges that 
Defendant Lin ultimately owed to explode.  The Workout Agreement was 
not just an extension of time, it also created a financial bomb of late charges 
if Defendant Lin failed to make the final payment when due.  This was not 
an obligation that Defendant Cao incurred when she signed her guarantee.  
 The Plaintiff relies on a New Mexico case, WXI/Z Sw. Malls v. 
Mueller, 137 N.M. 343, 110 P.3d 1080 (NM App.2005) to support the 
Plaintiff’s position.  The Court in WXI/Z also relied heavily on a variety of 
Restatements.  The Court in WXI/Z also addressed the issue of a breach of 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  The WXI/Z Court did not find a 
breach because it found that the Landlord had not increased the risk of the 
guarantor.   Id at §28.  This case has the crucial fact missing in WXI/Z.  The 
ever increasing burden related to the late payments increased the risk to the 
Defendant Cao.   
The Plaintiff and Defendant Lin materially modified the parties’ 
obligations under the original lease.  Those modifications were without the 
consent of Defendant Cao.  This Court should reverse the decision of the 
Court of Appeals and reinstate the Judgment of the Trial Court. 
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b. Notice 
The Assignment/Extension subject to this litigation was one of several 
Assignments/Extensions in a series of transactions over years.  Defendant 
Cao became involved when the Lease was assigned and extended for her 
company, L&C Unlimited, Corporation (L&C) in October 2003.  Defendant 
Cao signed the October 2003 Assignment and Modification of Lease 
Agreement (2003 Assignment) on behalf of L&C as the president, and 
personally as the Guarantor for L&C.   Paragraph 10 of the October 2003 
Assignment provides that “all notices to be given under this Assignment 
shall be in writing and sent by United States certified mail, return receipt 
requested with postage prepaid, and addressed’ L&C attention Defendant 
Cao.  On March 9, 2006, L&C assigned their interest in the Lease to Hong 
G. Lin.  The March 2006 Assignment and Extension of Lease (2006 
Assignment) required that “all notices to be given under this Assignment” 
shall be sent to Defendant Lin.  Paragraph 13 of the 2006 Assignment states: 
“Except as specifically modified, altered, or changed by this 
Agreement, the Lease and any amendments and/or extensions 
shall remain unchanged and in full force and effect throughout 
the Extension Term of the Lease.”    
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Defendant Lin first fell behind in his rent in October 2008.  Over the 
next twenty months, Defendant Lin racked up past due rent and late fees to 
the sum of $20,050.12.  During this time, neither Plaintiff nor Defendant Lin 
made any attempt to notify Defendant Cao about Defendant Lin’s default.  It 
is uncontested that Defendant Lin was in default when he failed to pay the 
full rent in October 2008 and he remained in default for over 20 months.   
The failure to notify Defendant Cao materially modified paragraph 10 of the 
2003 Assignment and paragraph 13 of the 2006 Assignment.  The fact that 
paragraph 10 of the 2006 Assignment directed notices to be sent to 
Defendant Lin did not abrogate the requirement that notices needed to be 
sent to Defendant Cao under the 2003 Assignment.  This approach is 
consistent with the Trial Court ruling that a material modification occurred 
“when they had Mr. Lin’s rent so far behind and allowed him to make 
changes and differences to that and didn’t notify the guarantor of that.  If I’m 
guaranteeing something and there’s changes like that and somebody’s way 
behind and they’re letting them catch up and they’re not telling me, I would 
consider that a material modification.”  Trial Transcript page 51-52.   
Although the lack of notice was the fundamental underpinnings for 
the Trial Court’s ruling, the Plaintiff has not offered no reason as to why 
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notice was not given.  Even before this Court, the Plaintiff avoids the issue.  
The lack of notice also extended to the Plaintiff’s dealings with Defendant 
Lin in the creation of the Workout Agreement.  It is uncontested that the 
Plaintiff and Defendant Lin negotiated and executed the Workout 
Agreement without any notice or input from Defendant Cao.  Defendant Cao 
was entitled to Notice under the 2003 Agreement.  Plaintiff and Defendant 
Lin materially modified the parties’ arrangement when they choose to 
engage on a series of transactions without notice to Defendant Cao.  The 
refusal of Plaintiff and Defendant Lin to include Defendant Cao in this 
dealings materially modified Defendant Cao’s ability to protect her interests.   
The lack of notice also impaired Defendant Cao’s rights under 
Restatement (Third) of Suretyship & Guaranty § 41 (c): “if the modification 
of the underlying obligation changes the amount of money payable 
thereunder, or the timing of such payment, the secondary obligor may 
perform the secondary obligation as though there had been no modification”.  
When Plaintiff and Defendant Lin agreed that Defendant Lin would remain 
in the premises while making partial payments, they modified the amount 
and timing of the payments.  As noted in Defendant Cao’s initial brief, 
Defendant Cao should have been afforded the opportunity to make the 
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payments under the original terms negating any late payments.  Defendant 
Cao’s Opening Brief page 26.  Defendant Cao’s right to stand on the original 
terms are only practical when Defendant Cao is informed that there has been 
a modification of the amounts payable or the timing of those payments.  
Because Plaintiff and Defendant Lin failed to provide any notice, they 
materially modified the parties’ contractual standing.  The lack of notice 
impaired Defendant Cao ability to assert her rights as envisioned under 
Restatement (Third) of Suretyship & Guaranty § 41 (c). Because the Trial 
Court recognized this basic right to notice, this Court should reverse the 
decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the Judgment of the Trial 
Court. 
2. DEFENDANT CAO’S GUARNTEE ENDED IN 2008 
Despite the Plaintiff’s assertions to the contrary, the 2003 and the 
2006 Agreement do contain a significant ambiguity.   If a contract is 
ambiguous, it will be construed against the drafter only if extrinsic evidence 
fails to clarify the intent of the parties. Wilburn v. Interstate Elec., 748 P.2d 
582, 585 (Utah App.).  This contract has an ambiguity that should be 
resolved in Defendant’s Cao’s favor.  If this Court cannot resolve it, then the 
matter should be remanded back to the Trial Court.  
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In 2003, Defendant Cao signed that agreement as President of L&C 
and personally as Guarantor.  That agreement speak of Guarantor in the 
singular.  Paragraph 4 of the Agreement specifically states that Defendant 
Cao is the Guarantor for the Agreement.  Under its terms, the 2003 
Agreement ended on September 30, 2008.   
The 2006 Agreement also refers to the Guarantor in the singular.  
However, the 2006 Agreement contains two Guarantors.  Defendant Cao 
signed the Agreement simply as “Guarantor’s Acknowledgment”.  Then 
accompanying the 2006 Agreement was a Guaranty signed by Hong G. Lin 
outlining the responsibilities and obligations of the guarantee.  As pointed 
out in Defendant Cao’s opening brief, Defendant Cao was required to sign 
the 2006 Agreement as Guarantor because she was the Guarantor to the 
2003 Agreement.  Had Defendant Cao not signed the 2006 Agreement, her 
guarantee under the 2003 Agreement would have ceased because of the 
material modification of the 2003 Agreement, namely the assignment. 
This was an issued raised by the parties at trial.  Trial Transcript pages 
29-32.  However the Trial Court did not address it in the Court’s ruling.  The 
Plaintiff offers no explanation why the 2006 Agreement speaks of a single 
Guarantor to that agreement yet the only person to sign a Guarantee 
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Agreement contemporaneous with the Agreement was Defendant Lin.  
When Defendant Cao personally signed the 2006 Agreement it was as an 
accommodating party.  Her accommodation ended when her original 
Guarantee ended in September 2008.   
While there is ambiguity as to who the 2006 Agreement was speaking 
about when it recited the obligations of the Guarantor, there is no ambiguity 
as to who intended to extend the lease term.  “Whereas, said Landlord, 
Assignor and Assignee desire to extend this Lease for an additional Five (5) 
year(s) period.”  There is no evidence that Defendant Cao, as the Guarantor 
of the 2003 Agreement, intended to extend her guarantee of the new lease 
term.  Because Defendant’s Cao’s obligation ended in 2008, this Court 
should reverse the Court of Appeals and remand this matter to the Trial 
Court. 
3. THERE WAS NO ASSIGNMENT OF THE GUARANTEE 
Much like the ambiguity of the Guarantor in 2006 Agreement, there is 
a corresponding problem with the assignment.  The Guarantee signed by 
Defendant Lin states; “HONG G. LIN, hereby guarantees to RIVERVIEW 
PROPERTIES, a general partnership, the Landlord, and its successor and 
assigns . . .”.  Conversely, the single paragraph binding Defendant Cao in 
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paragraph 4 of the 2003 Agreement contains no language indicating that the 
parties agreed that her guarantee could be assigned to another party.  
Defendant Cao’s guarantee was with Riverview Properties and not P.C. 
Riverview.  There is no language indicating the parties’ intent to be able to 
assign the guarantee. Plaintiff does not have standing to assert a guarantee 
against a party who has not assented to the assignment of the guarantee.  
Kemp v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 2013 UT App 88, ¶¶ 7–8, 301 P.3d 23. The 
parties may have assented to the assignment of the lease, but that does not 
create a corresponding assignment of the guarantee without some language 
indicating that the guarantor assented to the assignment. Because there is no 
evidence that the parties agreed to the assignment of the guarantee, this 
Court should dismiss Defendant Cao as a party. 
4. THE SCOPE OF DEFENDANT’S CAO’S GUARANTEE 
The scope of Defendant Cao’s guarantee is defined by the language 
creating the guarantee.  Paragraph 4 of the 2003 Agreement states: “Xiao 
Yan Cao, an individual, shall be the Guarantor and hereby guarantee 
performance of all covenants, conditions and obligation and duties required 
of Tenant under said Lease from and after October 1, 2003.”  The Tenant in 
October 2003 was Defendant Cao’s company L&C Unlimited Corporation.  
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L&C was never made a party to this action.  L&C, as the Assignor was 
responsible for the continuing obligations of the Assignee, Defendant Lin.  
Plaintiff is incorrect to assert that Defendant Cao’s obligations are absolute.  
Defendant’s Cao’s obligations were tied to her company L&C.  Because the 
Plaintiff failed to pursue L&C, Plaintiff there is no obligation to enforce 
against Defendant Cao.  The Court should dismiss the Plaintiff’s cause 
against Defendant Cao. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
The Court should reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the decision 
of the Trial Court.   
Dated: March 17, 2017. 
     _/s/______________________ 
     RUSSELL T. MONAHAN 
     Attorney for Defendant Cao 
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